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Monetary policy, cash holding and corporate investment:  
Evidence from China 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses 13,766 firm-year observations between 2003 and 2013 from China to 
investigate the effects of monetary policy on corporate investment and the mitigating 
effects of cash holding. We find that tightening monetary policy reduces corporate 
investment while cash holdings mitigate such adverse effects. The cash mitigating role 
is especially significant for financially constrained firms, non-state-owned enterprises 
(non-SOEs) and those firms located in a less developed financial market. Cash holding 
also improves investment efficiency when monetary policy is tightening and 
tightening monetary policy enhances the ‘cash-cash flow’ sensitivity. Our empirical 
evidence calls for a critical evaluation on the monetary policies implemented in China 
which are less effective for state-owned enterprises. It also calls for a necessity for 
local government to further develop regional financial markets to protect vulnerable 
businesses, such as non-SOEs and financially constrained firms, from external shocks 
in order to maintain their sustainable growth and competitive advantages.  
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Monetary policy, cash holding and corporate investment: Evidence from China 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Over the last decades, the monetary policies implemented by the central bank of China 
have gained particular attention globally and the adjustment of such policies has become more 
frequent due to the appreciation pressures on Chinese currency RMB and the pressure of the 
economic downturn. It has also been acknowledged that monetary policies, such as M2 growth 
rate, possess a strong capability of predicting economic growth (Higgins et al., 2016). Indeed, 
recent investigations on monetary policy and corporate investment in China have paid more 
attention to the role played by monetary policies in economic stabilization during financial 
crisis (Chang et al., 2015), economic expansion (Shen et al., 2015) and stimulus (e.g. Liu et al., 
2016). However, little is known about how businesses make investment decisions with 
tightening monetary policies by considering the heterogeneity of firm level (e.g. state-
ownership) and regional level factors (e.g. regional financial market).  
As one of the most important macroeconomic policies, monetary policies have been found 
to place a significant impact on corporate lending (Kashyap and Stein, 1993) and corporate 
investment (Morck et al., 2013). With an institutional background of interest rate marketization 
and investment-motivated economic growth in China (Song et al., 2011), the impacts of 
monetary policies on corporate finance become prominent (Li and Liu, 2017). Existing 
literature has shown clear evidence that central bank employs a set of instruments (e.g. M2 
growth rate) to adjust the costs of corporate loans and bank credit supply (He and Wang, 2012) 
in order to manage corporate investment (Chen et al., 2016). For example, with tightening 
monetary policies, businesses would reduce their investment due to stronger financial 
constraints they face when banks reduce their credit supply (Morck et al., 2013) and they rely 
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more heavily on internal sources of capital, such as cash holding, to finance investment (Allen 
et al., 2005). Therefore, it is likely that the effectiveness of tightening monetary policies on 
corporate investment could be mitigated by corporate cash holding. 
This paper aims to investigate, with tightening monetary policies, if corporate cash 
holding could mitigate the adverse effects of money tightening on corporate investment. In 
addition, we explicitly control for the heterogeneity of regional financial development and 
corporate ownership structure and examine if they make any difference on the potential 
mitigating effects of cash holding on corporate investment. This is particularly important in a 
Chinese setting for two reasons. On one hand, as an emerging economy, China is experiencing 
an economic transition where the degree of financial development is relatively low, compared 
with that in developed economies, and varies from region to region. Therefore, the sensitivities 
of commercial banks to monetary policy changes may vary on a regional basis (Carlino and 
DeFina, 1998). On the other hand, due to the credit discrimination in an economic transition 
period (Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull et al., 2005), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may have a 
superior access to bank credits because government may implicitly and explicitly guarantee 
bank loans issued to SOEs even their average productivity has been found to be lower than that 
of private firms (Song et al., 2011). Therefore, privately-owned enterprises could be more 
sensitive to business cycle shocks than SOEs (Chang et al., 2017) and Dickinson and Liu (2007) 
have shown that the variety of the degree of financial development and ownership structure 
could drive the heterogeneity of the impacts of monetary policies on individual business.  
In specific, this paper aims to answer three questions as (1) how monetary policies affect 
corporate investment in China, (2) whether corporate cash holding mitigates the effects of 
monetary policy on corporate investment decisions, and (3) how such effects vary over firms’ 
and regional characteristics, such as financial constraints, state ownership and financial 
development. We also carry out additional analysis to answer three highly relevant and 
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important questions. (1) Do financially constrained firms and non-SOEs voluntarily hold more 
cash when monetary policies are tightened? (2) What are the effects of cash holding on 
investment smoothing with tight monetary policies? (3) Would investment be more efficient 
when monetary policies become tightening? Answering these questions would enable us to 
better capture how businesses react to public policies by adjusting their financing and 
investment decisions. 
These research questions are particularly important for China for several reasons. First, 
during the period of economic transformation, monetary policy making is especially important 
for China where economic growth is investment driven (Song et al., 2011) and slowing down. 
Second, data from World Development Indicators shows that the fixed asset investment is 
experiencing a declining growth rate recently in China and the deviation of M2 growth rate 
from GDP growth has increased to 11% between 1982 and 2010. Therefore, an investigation 
on the effects of monetary policies on corporate investment would enable policy makers to 
better govern the volatility of M2 growth rates and economic growth. Finally, due to the 
imperfections in Chinese financial markets, Chinese companies, especially those located in less 
financially developed regions and non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs), may have limited 
access to external finance and therefore, cash would play an important role as an alternative 
internal source of finance for corporate investment.  
Our results indicate that the tightening of monetary policies in China does reduce 
corporate investments and the effectiveness of policy implementation is mitigated by corporate 
cash holdings. We also show that, with tightening monetary policies, financially constrained 
firms and those private firms (non-SOEs) would have to rely heavily on either internal cash 
holding or the availability of external finance from a well-developed financial market to sustain 
their investment. Such evidence reinforces the argument that monetary policy transmission 
would have heterogeneous impacts on real economy. Therefore, overall, this paper contributes 
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to relevant economic and finance research on corporate investment in China by offering unique 
empirical evidence on the variation of monetary policy effects on corporate investment, where 
“the consequences of bank loan supply shock on corporate financial policies across different 
groups of firms are unknown” (Shen et al., 2015, p.5).  
Our study contributes to the extant literature in four ways. First, complementary to 
existing literature at a macroeconomic level (e.g. Chang et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017), the 
empirical evidence provided in this paper deepens our understanding on the impacts monetary 
policies on corporate investment decision-making at a microeconomic level. Second, existing 
literature has shown the effects of tightening monetary policy on corporate investment by 
reducing credit supply (Morck et al., 2013) and constraining corporate finance (Huang et al., 
2012). This paper offers novel and additional evidence on the role played by cash holding to 
mitigating the adverse effects of monetary tightening by considering the variation at both firm 
(e.g. state-ownership) and regional level (e.g. regional financial development). Such evidence 
provides stronger implications to Chinese businesses who rely more heavily on internal 
retained profits to finance investment in an economic transition period (Allen et al., 2005). 
Third, recent studies have shown that the impacts of monetary policies on economies have 
become reduced because of the development of shadow banking market (Chen et al., 2017). 
To complement to existing studies on external determining factors, this paper focuses on the 
role played by corporate internal sources of finance in responding to monetary policy changes. 
Finally, this paper investigates the mechanisms and consequences (e.g. investment efficiency) 
of how cash holding mitigates the effects of monetary tightening. This is an addition to the 
recent development in China economic research on how one corporate finance decision making 
affects another.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background information in China and reviews relevant literature and develops hypotheses. 
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Section 3 describes the data and methodology. We report the empirical results in Section 4 and 
conclude in Section 5. 
   
2. Institutional background, Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Monetary policies in China and corporate investment  
A central bank usually applies both quantitative-based (targeting M2) and pricing 
(targeting interest rate) mechanisms as the fundamental instruments. For emerging economies, 
such as China (Li and Liu, 2017), a monetary aggregate, instead of interest rate, serves as the 
key monetary policy instrument. This is because, first, even interest rate has become 
deregulated, the current price-based monetary instruments in China is still subject to 
government intervention (Berger et al., 2009). For example, benchmark interest rates are still 
monitored by the central bank and only allowed to fluctuate in a narrow range1 (Chen et al., 
2011). Second, it has been widely accepted that Chinese business investment and households’ 
consumption level are not sensitive to interest rate fluctuations because of the lack of alternative 
investment options and a historically high propensity to save. Third, because the financial 
markets in China are not fully developed and the concept of potential GDP is much less defined 
than that in those countries with well-functioning financial markets, the original interest rule is 
inapplicable to the Chinese policymaking environment (Chen et al., 2016).  
Therefore, quantitative-based monetary policy has been playing a dominant role, as a key 
monetary instrument in China, in supporting economic reform and sustainable economic 
development (Chen et al., 2016), and with the transition of monetary policy framework in 
China, institutional rigidity and monetary supply continue to be an essential monetary policy 
target (Li and Liu, 2017). Indeed, the use of quantitative tools has long been the norm for 
                                                          
1  Approved by the State Council, the relaxing of the control on the lowest interest rate marked the implementation 
of fully marketization of interest rates since 20 July 2013. 
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China's monetary policy making where Chinese government continues to set a money-supply 
(M2) target every year, 13.3% M2 growth in 2015 for instance, and regulators rely on lending 
quotas to govern credit supply of banks2. Given the predominant role played by banks in 
providing external finance in China, monetary policies are more likely to affect corporate 
activities via a credit channel, bank lending channel in particular (Bernanke and Blinder, 1995). 
Such a bank lending channel has been documented in U.S (e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 1993) and 
in particular, it plays an indispensable role in implementing monetary policies in China where 
interest rates are regulated and financial markets are not fully developed (Chen et al., 2016). In 
addition, government intervention has placed strong impacts on the operation of banking 
market which is dominated by state-owned commercial banks (Berger et al., 2009).  
 While firms are expected to react to changes in loan rate, the aggregate level of 
investment may depend more heavily on the availability of bank loans through the credit 
channel when monetary policy becomes tight and loan market supply reduces. Policy makers 
would apply a tightening monetary policy to smooth economic cycles when firms over invest 
and there is a high inflation rate. Banks may also increase reserves to ensure their own safety, 
leading to a reduction in money multiplier and a credit crunch. Consequently, banks would 
reduce credit supply and corporate investors would have a reduced access to external finance 
for investment (Morck et al., 2013). Therefore, we hypothesize 
 
H1:  Corporate investment reduces with tightening monetary policies in China.  
 
                                                          
2 PBC is able to control M2 growth because it has tight control of commercial banks in the nation. The five largest 
commercial banks are state owned and other large commercial banks are heavily regulated by the government. 
8 
 
2.2 Monetary policy, cash holdings and corporate investment 
The sensitivity of corporate investment to monetary policy change is dependent on 
business financing capabilities and its reliance on internal funds. For example, to investigate 
the impacts of monetary policy tightening on inventories and short-term debt of manufacturing 
firms, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find that monetary tightening squeezes corporate cash and 
the effects of cash squeeze on economic behavior depend heavily on firms’ ability to smooth 
the cash-flow decline by borrowing.   
The evidence focusing on Chinese monetary policies has been available from Huang et 
al. (2012). The authors report that both quantity-oriented and price-based monetary policies in 
China have heterogeneous effects on corporate investment behavior and firms with higher 
liquidity, less inventory and lower asset–liability ratios are less sensitive to monetary policy 
tightening. The firm size effects, however, are non-monotonic where larger firms are less 
affected by quantity-oriented monetary policies, but more sensitive to price-based monetary 
policies. Furthermore, Chinese businesses rely heavily on retained profits due to the less 
developed financial markets, the existence of asymmetric information problem and weak legal 
protection of investors (Allen et al., 2005). Such a unique corporate financing pattern in China 
would affect the effectiveness of implementing monetary policies and their effects on corporate 
investment decisions (Georgopoulos and Hejazi, 2009).  
As in the classic line of corporate finance literature, financial constraints and credit 
supply fluctuations would affect corporate investment. This is because shocks to credit supply, 
along with the presence of financing frictions, would have an adverse effect on corporate 
investment if firms lack sufficient financial slack to finance all profitable investment 
opportunities and such effects are particularly severe in firms that are financially constrained 
or heavily dependent on external finance. For precautionary purposes, corporate demand for 
cash is to protect themselves against adverse cash-flow volatility (Opler et al., 1999) and the 
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risk of underinvesting in the future (Almeida et al., 2004). Ample empirical evidence has shown 
the hedging role played by cash holdings for corporate investment (e.g. Duchin et al., 2010), 
where the more cash reserved, the better protected are the firms from adverse monetary policy 
shocks. Following monetary policy tightening, increases in interest payments would reduce 
corporate profits, which, in turn, squeeze cash and reduce the net firm value. Consequently, 
external financial risk premium increases, corporate investment declines and business demand 
for loans reduces; whereas, a higher level of cash holdings and net asset value would improve 
the availability of internal finance and provide more collateral to reduce external financing cost 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Therefore, we hypothesize 
 
H2: Cash holding mitigates the adverse impacts of tightening monetary policies on corporate 
investment. 
 
In line with Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) insight that cash only matters to a company 
when financial markets are not frictionless. Monetary tightening would primarily lead to a 
decline in bank loan supply. In order to avoid high adjustment costs, firms, that have 
asymmetric information issues and poor access to credit markets, may have to respond to the 
adverse financing shocks by establishing sufficient liquidity reserves to maintain a relatively 
smooth path of investment (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). Hence, the marginal value of cash 
holdings would be greater for financially constrained firms (Faulkender and Wang, 2006), and 
we hypothesize that  
 
H3: The mitigating effects of cash holding on corporate investment are stronger for financially 
constrained firms when monetary policies become tightened. 
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2.3 State ownership and corporate investment 
Along with the economic reform in China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private 
firms have become two dominant identities in China but they differ significantly in terms of 
objectives, resource endowment, operational risks and government intervention. Credit 
allocation in China has long been characterized by government intervention and as being biased 
towards state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (e.g. Brandt and Li, 2003). This is because Chinese 
government provides both explicit and implicit guarantees and subsidies for loans issued to 
SOEs3 and motivates banks to lend even SOEs are found to have lower average productivities 
than private firms in China (Song et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2017).  This is especially prominent 
in the periods with economic stimulus where SOEs have access to much more credit supplies 
but invest with even lower efficiencies (Cong and Ponticelli, 2017). In addition, with the 
development of economic reform in China, such as the policy of ‘grasping the large and letting 
go of the small’, SOEs have become bigger in size and had greater resource endowment, by 
mergers and acquisitions for instance, compared with non-SOEs in China. However, the bias 
of banks against private firms has not changed. 
In contrast, without the guarantee and subsidies from government, non-SOEs suffer 
from more strict credit policies (e.g. Brandt and Li, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). For example, 
financial institutions usually charge higher interest rates and impose stiffer conditions on non-
SOEs in order to avoid to bear extra risk of hidden information and actions (Leland and Pyle, 
1977), leading non-SOEs to rely more heavily on retained profits to finance investment (Cull 
et al., 2015). Therefore, with tightening monetary policies, non-SOEs would rely more heavily 
on their internal sources of finance (e.g. cash reserves) to sustain investment activities than 
SOEs. Hence, we hypothesize 
                                                          
3 When the budget of commercial banks becomes harder, government intervention effects on bank operation has 
become weaker in China. Even though, commercial banks are still more willing to finance SOEs than non-SOEs 
in China ( Brandt and Li,2003).  
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H4: With tightening monetary policies, the mitigating effects of cash holding would be stronger 
for non-SOEs than for SOEs.  
 
2.4 Financial development and corporate investment 
Economic theories have suggested that distinctive economic, financial and institutional 
structures of local economies, as well as local policies, need to be factored into the 
heterogeneous responses of corporate activities to a monetary policy. Indeed, a growing 
literature has documented regional asymmetries in business cycles, the incidence of regional 
shocks, and the differential responses to aggregate economic shocks, highlighting the 
importance of understanding the mechanism by which monetary policies disseminate 
throughout various regions of an economy. For example, the degree of financial development 
and the sensitivities of commercial banks to monetary policy changes may vary from region to 
region (Carlino and DeFina, 1998) and hence, the impacts of monetary policy tightening on 
corporate investment would be heterogeneous (Kashyap and Stein, 1993). Owyang et al. (2005) 
investigate regional business cycles at different disaggregation levels and find considerable 
differences in the volatility of regional cycles. Canova and Pappa (2007) consider regional 
price differentials caused by fiscal policy effects and show that deficit-financed expansionary 
fiscal disturbances increase price dispersions, while expansionary fiscal shocks financed by 
distortionary taxation reduce such dispersions, suggesting that regional variation in price 
dynamics may interfere with the price stability goal. Empirical evidence on the geographically 
disaggregated effects of monetary policy has also been available from Carlino and DeFina 
(1998) among others. They find that regional asymmetries exist at various levels of 
disaggregation restrictions. For example, structural and financial factors are sensibly related to 
cross-region differences in governing the dissemination of monetary policy shocks. 
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While the financial system in China has long been characterized by the dominance of 
stated-owned banks (Cull and Xu, 2003), the Chinese banking market has experienced dramatic 
changes over the past decades in response to various reforms and a more competitive 
environment. The joint-stock reform of state-owned banks and the financial liberalization since 
China entering WTO has indeed changed the old facet of monopolization of China’s 
commercial banking market and led to a new and more competitive banking system with highly 
diverse ownership structures. Nevertheless, the majority state shareholdings continue to allow 
government to place effective controls on all major banks.  
There are also significant variations in terms of financial development from one 
location to another in China, leading to an unbalanced development across regions and 
becoming a constraining factor for regional economic growth. For example, since 2000, credit 
supply in East China accounted for more than 60% of total credit supply in China. In the 
presence of deadweight losses due to information asymmetries, one notable fact about regional 
financial development is the provision of a better alternative to internal finance for corporate 
investment activities (e.g. Hsu et al., 2014). A well-functioning financial market may 
effectively reduce the probability of a firm being financially constrained and promote capital 
accumulation and technological advancement. Therefore, the process of reducing costs of 
acquiring private information, enforcing contracts, and executing transactions would lead to 
local savings and productive investments in local businesses. In China, a more developed 
institutional environment would mitigate the threat of political extraction for businesses 
(Kusnadi et al., 2015). Whereas, those firms located in less developed regions would rely more 
heavily on internal sources of finance, such as cash holding, when monetary policy becomes 
tightened. Therefore, we hypothesize 
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H5: With tightening monetary policies, the mitigating effects of cash holdings on investment 
would be stronger for firms located in less financially developed regions than those in well-
developed regions. 
 
3. Methodology: Data, Variables and Empirical approaches 
 
3.1 Data and variables 
To test the hypotheses derived above, we use 13,766 firm-year observations in China 
between 2003 and 2013 and the empirical data are collected from various sources. Our sample 
companies are those publicly listed (A-shares) in either Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges, excluding financial firms (banks and insurance companies), companies with 
missing values and those special treatment (ST) and particular transfer (PT) firms. The 
financial information of sample firms is collected from CSMAR (China Securities Market and 
Accounting Research) and ownership structure of sample firms is obtained from CCER (China 
Center for Economic Research). The financial development information at province level is 
hand collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China and Almanac of China’s Finance 
and Banking.  
We follow Duchin et al. (2010) and define the key dependent variable (Invest) as the 
year change of total fixed assets, constructions in progress and intangible assets standardized 
by total assets value. The growth rate of M2 has been identified as a key indicator for the nature 
of monetary policy and a determinant for corporate investment in both developed markets 
(McCallum, 2000) and China (Chen et al., 2016; Li and Liu, 2017). Hence, we measure 
monetary policy (MP) by the opposite value of M2 growth rate (Li and Liu, 2017). A lower 
value of MP points to an expansionary monetary policy and a higher value points to a tightening 
policy. In robustness tests, we also measure the nature of monetary policy in different ways, 
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such as, benchmark loan rate (Galí and Monacelli, 2005) and reserve requirement ratio (RRR) 
(Chang et al., 2017). It is expected that the tightening monetary policy (i.e. higher MP) would 
impose a negative impact on Invest where businesses reduce investment with more tightening 
monetary policies.  
Cash holding (Casht-1) is measured as the ratio between the total of cash plus short term 
investment and total assets at time t-1. Another important determinant of investment is if a 
sample firm is financially constrained. We use two variables to measure financial constraints: 
size of assets (Size) and Kaplan-Zingales index (KZ). By following Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), we use asset size, interest cover, leverage and operating cash flows to construct a KZ 
index. A sample firm is defined as having high (low) financial constraints if its KZ index or 
asset size is greater (lower) than industry median. Indeed, KZ index has been widely used in 
existing empirical studies on corporate financial constraints in China. To test the validity of 
KZ index in a Chinese setting, we run univariate analysis and correlation tests and our results 
show that KZ index is highly related to the state-ownership, regional financial development 
and financial performance at firm level (e.g. cash, dividend and interest cover). Therefore, KZ 
index is a valid measure of financial constraint for Chinese firms4.  
 We also consider the state ownership structure of sample firms where SOE is coded as 
1 if a sample firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is state government and 0 if a non-SOE. 
Financial development (FD) is measured at a province level by the ratio between total bank 
loans and GDP in a particular province where a sample firm headquarters. The greater the value 
of FD, the more developed the financial market is in a particular province5. Firm investment 
                                                          
4 We thank Prof. Zheng Song, the co-editor, for raising this issue and the results are available from the authors on 
request.  
5 Due to the nature of model specification and the variables (e.g. small variation and range for KZ index) and the 
research objective of the paper, we employ a grouping approach in the following empirical analysis by categorize 
samples by their state-ownership, the degree of financial development in the region (i.e. province) where the 
sample firm headquarters and the degree of financial constraints the sample firm faces. We thank an anonymous 
referee for pointing this out.   
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follows a long term pattern and therefore, we consider Investt-1 as a control variable. Other 
control variables include operating cash flows (CF), leverage (Lev), return on asset (Roa), asset 
structure (Tangible), growth rate (Growth), Tobin’s Q (Q). Detailed definitions of the key 
variables are presented in Table 1.  
 
3.2 Empirical approaches 
We follow Bond and Meghir (1994) to investigate the impacts of monetary policy on 
corporate investment (H1) by Eq. (1).  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑛 ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖.𝑡                   (1) 
 
To examine the mitigating effects of cash holding on monetary policy impacts on 
corporate investment (H2), we consider the interaction term between cash holding and 
monetary policy as Eq.(2). 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝑛 ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖.𝑡     (2) 
 
where i refers to sample firm and t for year. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes a vector of firm-level controls, i
captures individual effects and ti, is the error term. We use System GMM to control for the 
autocorrelation where Investi,t-1 is potentially correlated with firm specific individual effects 
( i ). We take first-differences of Eq. (2) and use further lagged values as instruments for 
Investi,t-1, which are not correlated with the residuals in differences, assuming no serial 
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correlation in 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. To test the validity of the models, we run Arellano-Bond test on error term 
correlation and Hansen test on over-identification6.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 reports the variables, definitions and their descriptive statistics. To control for 
the outlier effects, we winsorize values to a 1st/99th level. Corporate investment is about 4.2% 
of total assets on average between 2003 and 2013, ranging from -15.6% to 45.9%. During the 
same period, the tightness of monetary policy in China also varied significant, ranging from -
0.277 to -0.136 with a mean at -0.168. Cash holding (cash and short-term investment) is about 
18.6% of total assets and SOEs account for 49.7% of total listed firms in our samples. 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (N=13,730) 
Variables Definition Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Invest Investment  0.042 0.018 0.088 -0.156 0.459 
MP Tightness of monetary policy  -0.168 -0.167 0.041 -0.277 -0.136 
Cash Cash holding 0.186 0.148 0.141 0.008 0.741 
State State-owned enterprise (0,1) 0.503 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
CF Operating cash flow/total assets 0.045 0.045 0.078 -0.205 0.264 
Lev Total liabilities/total assets 0.481 0.491 0.215 0.047 1.094 
Size Ln (total assets) 21.679 21.545 1.169 19.137 25.221 
Roa Net profits/total assets 0.035 0.034 0.059 -0.238 0.201 
Q Market value/book value 1.809 1.439 1.069 0.705 7.136 
Tangible Fixed assets/total assets 0.259 0.225 0.177 0.003 0.756 
Growth Growth rate of operating income 0.174 0.13 0.356 -0.612 2.150 
 
                                                          
6 Following Kashyap and Stein (2000) among others, we do not control for the year fixed effects in the regression 
analysis because of the collinearity between the growth rate of M2 and year dummies.  
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4.2 Baseline results: monetary policy, cash holdings and corporate investment 
Table 2 reports the baseline results where tightening monetary policy reduces corporate 
investment, support H1. Our results are robust to a variety of regression models, such as pooled 
OLS (Model 1), Fixed Effects (Model 2), Random Effects (Model 3) and System GMM (Model 
4) which considers the potential endogeneity issue and heterogeneity7.  
 
Table 2: Baseline results – monetary policy effects on corporate investment 
Invest Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pooled OLS FE RE System GMM 
MP -0.044*** -0.355*** -0.389*** -0.036**  
 (-2.78) (-4.49) (-5.92) (-2.36)    
CF 0.030*** 0.026** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 (3.14) (2.49) (3.42) (3.85)    
Lev -0.017*** -0.059*** -0.017*** -0.025*** 
 (-3.83) (-6.35) (-3.84) (-4.96)    
Size -0.002*** -0.026*** -0.001 -0.004*** 
 (-2.65) (-9.37) (-1.63) (-5.16)    
Roa 0.212*** 0.161*** 0.215*** 0.204*** 
 (12.70) (8.25) (12.85) (11.70)    
Q -0.003*** 0.003** -0.002** -0.002**  
 (-3.34) (2.48) (-2.31) (-2.27)    
Tangible -0.037*** -0.266*** -0.040*** -0.073*** 
 (-6.39) (-18.07) (-6.71) (-10.20)    
Growth 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.003    
 (1.58) (-0.02) (0.53) (1.25)    
Investt-1 0.325*** 0.110*** 0.322*** 0.242*** 
 (28.30) (9.15) (27.97) (12.91)    
Constant 0.074*** 0.629*** 0.009 0.146*** 
 (4.42) (9.19) (0.43) (7.35)    
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 13,730 13,730 
R2_adj 0.219 0.171   
F 81.283 57.563   
AR1    0.000 
AR2    0.795 
Hansen test    0.781 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are pooled OLS (Model 1), Fixed Effects (Model 
2), Random Effects (Model 3) and System GMM (Model 4). T values are reported in parentheses and *, ** 
and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. We do not consider year fixed effects in 
Models 1 and 4 where monetary policies show strong correlations with year dummies.  
                                                          
7  In the following analysis, we consistently employ a System GMM approach to control for the possible 
endogeneity and heterogeneity as indicated model specification otherwise. The possible endogeneity issue may 
exist for two reasons. First, we consider Investt-1 which may correlate with the error term. Second, M2 could be 
endogenous where unobservable factors may affect both M2 growth and investment simultaneously. Therefore, 
we use the first difference of monetary policy measures (e.g. growth rate of M2) as an instrument in the 
regressions. 
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Table 3 reports the baseline results where we investigate the effects of cash holding and 
monetary policy on corporate investment. Model 1 shows that holding more cash increases 
corporate investment and mitigates the adverse effects of tightening monetary policies on 
investment (Model 2), supporting H2. Financially constrained firms may under-invest and 
therefore, monetary policies and cash holding may have more significant impacts on their 
investment activities. To test H3, we use both KZ index and asset size to categorize sample 
firms into low vs. high financial constraint groups8 and Table 3 (Models 3-6) shows that cash 
plays a more important role to mitigate the adverse effects of tightening monetary policies for 
those firms with high financial constraints. The mitigating effect is insignificant for less 
financially constrained firms, supporting H3. Our baseline results imply that the monetary 
policy is mainly efficient where government could effectively reduce corporate investment by 
implementing more tightened monetary policies. However, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy on corporate investment is mitigated by the cash holding of individual firms, especially 
those financially constrained firms. 
 
  
                                                          
8 This paper aims to (1) investigate the effects of monetary policy and cash holding on corporate investment and 
(2) the heterogeneity of such effects in a variety of corporate settings, such as state-ownership, degree of regional 
financial development and the degree of financial constraints. For the latter, instead of using further three-way 
interaction terms, e.g. cash×MP×KZ, we follow recent studies (e.g. Poncet et al., 2010) and adopt a grouping 
approach by categorizing our samples according to their state-ownership, financial development and financial 
constraints. Such a grouping approach would better capture the variation and makes more sense in interpreting 
the results. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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Table 3: Financial constraints, cash holdings and corporate investment 
Invest 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
All samples All samples 
Financial Constraints 
KZ Index Size 
Low High Big Small 
MP -0.033** -0.070*** -0.071** -0.067* -0.078** -0.061 
 
(-2.18) (-2.82) (-2.05) (-1.67) (-2.32) (-1.45) 
Cash 0.014** 0.045*** 0.026 0.057*** 0.025 0.054** 
 
(2.20) (2.89) (1.01) (2.69) (1.10) (2.52) 
Cash×MP  0.170** 0.073 0.236** 0.125 0.220* 
 
 (2.14) (0.53) (2.23) (1.07) (1.94) 
Constant 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.189*** 0.297*** 0.198*** 0.335*** 
 
(6.99) (6.52) (6.01) (7.76) (5.90) (7.35) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.812 0.799 0.725 0.579 0.340 0.570 
Hansen test 0.774 0.791 0.674 0.123 0.121 0.051 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are GMM. T values are reported in parentheses and *, 
** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. We define a sample firm to have high (low) 
financial constraint if its KZ index is greater (lower) than industry median or its size is smaller (bigger) than industry 
median in year t. The results of control variables are not reported but available on request from the authors. 
 
4.3 Ownership structure and financial development 
 As mentioned earlier, the effects of monetary policy may vary over the ownership 
structure and financial development. Table 4 shows that both monetary policy tightening 
effects and cash holdings mitigating effects on corporate investment are more significant for 
non-SOEs than for SOEs, supporting H4. There are three important implications here. First, 
the result reflects the fact that SOEs have a better access to finance to sustain their investment 
activities than non-SOEs and SOEs are less sensitive to monetary policy changes. Second, such 
effects on non-SOEs determine the effectiveness of monetary policies implemented in China 
where investment in SOEs is not sensitive to the tightness of monetary policies (Model 1). 
Finally, because of the limited access to additional finance for non-SOEs, especially when 
monetary policy is tight, non-SOEs have to rely more heavily on internal cash holding to sustain 
corporate investment activities. 
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Table 4: Corporate investment: SOEs vs non-SOEs  
 Invest 
Model 1 Model 2 
SOEs Non-SOEs 
MP -0.045 -0.125*** 
 (-1.31) (-3.31) 
Cash 0.033* 0.064** 
 (1.71) (2.50) 
Cash×MP 0.115 0.305** 
 (1.20) (2.21) 
Constant  0.190*** 0.628*** 
  (5.90) (3.77) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 6,828 6,902 
AR1 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.109 0.098 
Hansen test 0.647 0.938 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are GMM. T values are reported in 
parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of 
control variables are not reported but available on request from the authors. 
 
It has also been widely accepted that financial development would be in favor of 
corporate investment by providing a better access and cheaper finance to businesses (Hsu et 
al., 2014). Table 5 reports the results by considering the financial development at a province 
level (31 provinces in total in China) where the sample firm headquarters and it shows that 
monetary policies and cash holding have similar effects on regions with either low or high 
financial development. However, the mitigating effect of cash holding (interaction term) is 
stronger in those provinces with low financial development, supporting H5. This result reflects 
that firms would rely more heavily on internal sources of finance, e.g. cash holding, to invest 
if external finance becomes more limited in less developed financial markets. Financial 
development, instead, could provide businesses a better access to external finance so that they 
rely less heavily on internal cash for investment when monetary policies are tight. 
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Table 5: Financial development and corporate investment 
 Invest 
Model 1 Model 2 
Financial Development 
High Low 
MP -0.024 -0.101*** 
 (-0.59) (-3.34)    
Cash 0.021 0.061*** 
 (0.81) (3.11)    
Cash×MP 0.046 0.248**  
 (0.35) (2.49)    
Constant  0.118*** 0.146*** 
  (3.66) (5.53)    
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 4,796 8,934    
AR1 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.893 0.498 
Hansen Test 0.547 0.733 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are GMM. Local financial development 
is measured as bank loan amount/GDP in province i in year t. A province would have a high 
financial development if this ratio is greater than country average in year t. T values are reported in 
parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results 
of control variables are not reported but available on request from the authors.  
 
 
 
4.4 Additional tests 
As shown above, internal cash holding is a mitigating factor to alleviate the constraints 
imposed by tightening monetary policies in China. In this section, we conduct additional tests 
to answer three highly relevant and important questions which enable us to better capture the 
mechanisms behind the mitigating effects.  
 
4.4.1 Do financially constrained firms and non-SOEs voluntarily hold more cash when 
monetary policies are tightened? 
With tight monetary policies, credit supplies reduce and firms would rely more heavily 
on internal sources of finance, such as their cash reserves, to finance investment activities. 
Earlier results have shown that the reliance on internal cash holding is especially important for 
those financially constrained firms, non-SOEs and those firms headquartering in less developed 
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financial markets. To answer the question of if such firms voluntarily hold more cash to 
mitigate the adverse effects of tight monetary policies, we follow Almeida et al. (2004) and run 
a cash-cash flow sensitivity model as Eq. (3).  
 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
                        𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7∆𝑁𝑤𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8∆𝑆𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                         (3) 
 
where ΔCash is the change of asset-standardized cash between t and t-1; CF is cash flow 
(operating cash flow/total assets) and MP  measures the tightness of monetary policy at t-1. We 
also consider Q (Tobin’s Q), Size, Capex (Capital expenditure), ΔNwc (change of non-cash 
operating cash), and ΔSdebt (change of short term liabilities) as control variables. 
Table 6 shows that cash flow increases and tight monetary policies reduce corporate 
cash holding. The interaction term (MP×CF) has a positive coefficient in Models 2 (all 
samples), 4 and 6 (samples with high financial constraints), 8 (non-SOEs) and 10 (samples 
locating in less developed financial markets). Therefore, Table 6 suggests that those firms who 
rely more heavily on external financial markets and internal cash holdings would voluntarily 
hold more cash with tight monetary policies. In other words, the tightening of monetary policies 
strengthen the cash-cash flow sensitivities for such firms.  
 
4.4.2 What are the effects of cash holding on investment smoothing with tight monetary 
policies? 
Above empirical results have shown clear evidence on the adverse effects of tight 
monetary policy and favorable effects of cash holding on corporate investment activities. By 
following Brown and Petersen (2011), we further test if monetary policy and cash holding have 
any impact on investment smoothing by Eq. (4).  
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∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝑛 ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  …………………………….(4) 
 
where ΔInvest is the change of investment over two periods and we also include the same set 
of control variables, ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖,𝑡−1, used in Eq. (1).  
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Table 6: Monetary policy and cash-cash flow sensitivity 
ΔCash 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
All sample 
Financial constraint (KZ) Financial constraints (size) Ownership Financial development 
Low High Low High SOE Non-SOE High Low 
CF 0.323*** 0.490*** 0.313*** 0.600*** 0.423*** 0.584*** 0.498*** 0.487*** 0.456*** 0.499*** 
 (16.22) (5.85) (3.21) (4.35) (5.07) (4.18) (4.00) (4.40) (4.22) (4.43)    
MP  -0.320*** -0.225*** -0.368*** -0.319*** -0.432*** -0.231*** -0.427*** -0.274*** -0.338*** 
  (-7.24) (-4.31) (-5.32) (-8.22) (-5.30) (-3.77) (-6.49) (-4.50) (-5.81)    
MP×CF  1.030** 0.077 1.657** 0.615 1.744** 0.832 1.270** 0.830 1.074*   
  (2.26) (0.15) (2.17) (1.41) (2.25) (1.18) (2.21) (1.43) (1.75)    
Constant -0.133*** -0.183*** -0.006 -0.393*** -0.353*** -0.945*** -0.181*** -0.247*** -0.140*** -0.208*** 
 (-4.20) (-6.28) (-0.13) (-5.97) (-12.00) (-7.51) (-6.30) (-4.61) (-2.79) (-5.88)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 6,828 6,902 4,796 8,934    
R2_adj 0.063 0.067 0.067 0.076 0.194 0.053 0.148 0.047 0.078 0.066    
F 35.420 26.850 14.028 15.904 28.962 12.670 14.231 12.039 11.833 19.125  
Note: The dependent variable is ΔCash and models applied are Pooled OLS. T values are reported in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. The results of control variables are not reported but available on request from the authors. 
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Table 7: Monetary policy, cash holding and investment smoothing 
ΔInvest 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
All sample 
Financial constraint (KZ) Financial constraints (size) Ownership Financial development 
Low High Low High SOE Non-SOE High Low 
ΔCash -0.028** -0.086*** -0.060 -0.125*** -0.042 -0.114*** 0.001 -0.101*** -0.013 -0.141*** 
 (-2.49) (-2.93) (-1.23) (-3.36) (-0.79) (-3.12) (0.01) (-2.92) (-0.27) (-3.96)    
MP  -0.052*** -0.073*** -0.032 -0.065*** -0.011 -0.053** -0.055** -0.035 -0.067*** 
  (-3.23) (-3.33) (-1.39) (-3.07) (-0.45) (-2.38) (-2.34) (-1.38) (-3.36)    
MP×ΔCash  -0.352** -0.265 -0.500** -0.253 -0.420** 0.024 -0.391** 0.089 -0.667*** 
  (-2.13) (-0.97) (-2.43) (-0.87) (-2.06) (0.08) (-1.97) (0.30) (-3.47)    
Constant 0.146*** 0.163*** 0.126*** 0.249*** 0.214*** 0.299*** 0.228*** 0.169*** 0.153*** 0.180*** 
 (8.54) (9.14) (4.43) (7.40) (7.46) (6.38) (2.74) (5.79) (5.44) (7.75)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 6,828 6,902 4,796 8,934    
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.804 0.778 0.540 0.938 0.992 0.765 0.382 0.109 0.953 0.502 
Hansen test 0.730 0.716 0.224 0.417 0.314 0.628 0.724 0.811 0.825 0.412 
Note: The dependent variable is ΔInvest and models applied are System GMM.T values are reported in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. The results of control variables are not reported but available on request from the authors.
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Table 7 shows that indeed, firms use cash holding to smooth investment in order to 
achieve a certain amount of investment (Model 1), being reflected as a substitute (negative) 
relationship between ΔInvest and ΔCash. It also shows that monetary tightening strengthens 
the smoothing effects and such effects are especially strong for those non-SOEs and those 
having financial constraints and locating in less-developed financial markets.  
 
4.4.3 Would investment be more efficient when monetary policies become tightening? 
Facing tightening monetary policies, firms may use funds more efficiently in 
investment and in this section, we further investigate how monetary policies affect corporate 
investment efficiency. We follow Chen et al. (2011) and measure investment efficiency by the 
sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities as shown in Eq. (5) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑄𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑛 ∑ 𝑍𝑛,𝑖.𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     ……….(5) 
 
In Eq.(5), we use the same set of variables as defined in Eq. (1) and the coefficient of the 
interaction term between Casht-1  and Tobin’s Q captures the sensitivity of investment to cash 
holding and investment opportunities. We also control for Crisis (years 2008 – 2010) in the 
model where investment opportunities could be fewer than those in normal market conditions. 
Table 8 shows that in most models, investment opportunities drive businesses to invest and for 
those highly financially constrained firms, corporate investment would not positively react to 
such opportunities (Models 5 and 7). Cash holding always improves corporate investment in 
all models and it also increases corporate investment efficiency by improving the sensitivities 
of investments to opportunities (measured by an interaction term) when monetary policy is 
tight (Model 3). In addition, the favorable effects of cash on investment efficiency become 
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stronger when monetary policies are tightening and more significant for those firms whose 
investment depends heavily on internal sources of finance, such as those financially constrained 
firms (Models 5 and 7), non-SOEs (Model 9) and firms headquartered in less-development 
financial markets (Model 11).    
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Table 8: Monetary policy, cash holding and investment efficiencies 
Investi,t 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
All sample 
Financial constraint (KZ) Financial constraint (size) Ownership Financial development 
Low High Low High SOE Non-SOE High Low 
Q 0.003*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.000 0.005*** -0.004*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.003 0.003*   
 (2.67) (2.54) (2.74) (0.15) (3.18) (-3.41) (3.00) (-0.35) (1.57) (1.79)    
Cash 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.131*** 0.079*** 0.023** 0.018* 0.139*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.098*** 
 (8.02) (7.78) (6.45) (5.17) (2.10) (1.89) (6.47) (6.03) (4.12) (6.78)    
Casht-1×Q 0.003** 0.009*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.008* 0.010*** 
 (2.45) (3.57) (0.23) (3.63) (0.14) (3.33) (0.83) (4.21) (1.91) (3.06)    
MP  -0.027 -0.015 -0.022 -0.057* -0.070* -0.013 -0.056 0.009 -0.044    
  (-1.11) (-0.46) (-0.57) (-1.89) (-1.86) (-0.41) (-1.52) (0.23) (-1.46)    
MP t-1×Casht-1×Q  0.034*** 0.006 0.042** 0.016 0.041** 0.024 0.044*** 0.030* 0.037**  
  (2.84) (0.33) (2.49) (0.98) (2.24) (1.19) (2.88) (1.69) (2.29)    
Constant 0.420*** 0.413*** 0.525*** 0.560*** 0.026 0.121** 0.502*** 0.371*** 0.412*** 0.422*** 
 (7.65) (7.50) (6.16) (6.26) (0.77) (2.24) (6.96) (4.34) (4.69) (5.86)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 6,828 6,902 4,796 8,934    
R2_adj 0.066 0.066 0.087 0.059 0.102 0.110 0.090 0.054 0.057 0.071    
F 46.631 39.022 22.553 18.419 17.735 22.139 23.334 20.837 11.785 26.108   
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are System GMM. T values are reported in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively.. The results of control variables are not reported but available on request from the authors.
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4.5 Robustness tests 
 We run a rich set of robustness tests to examine the validity of our empirical findings 
and report the results as supplementary data. For example, we replace System-GMM approach 
by pooled OLS clustered at firm level with either fixed effects or random effects (Table S1). 
We also explicitly consider the effects of financial crisis (2008-2010) by using a dummy 
variable to control for financial crisis period (Table S2A) and the effects of the ‘stimulus plan’ 
implemented in China after financial crisis since 2008 (Table S2B). The results show that our 
earlier empirical results are robust to various empirical approaches.  
Moreover, we measure the key variables in different ways. Instead of using the growth 
rate of M2 in earlier tests, we employ benchmark loan rate and reserve requirement ratio (RRR) 
as alternative measures for monetary policy (Table S3). In terms of corporate investment, we 
use cash expenditure on fixed assets, intangible assets and other long term assets, standardized 
by total assets, to measure corporate investment alternatively (Table S4). In addition, we follow 
Xiao and Li (2016) to measure corporate investment opportunities by a corrected Tobin’s Q9 
(Table S5) and finally, we consider the sample firms with positive investment only (Table S6). 
Again, our results are robust to various measures of the key variables. We report all these 
robustness test results as supplementary materials. 
In the above baseline models and additional tests, we use total bank loans/GDP at 
province level to measure regional financial development. There could be a danger, especially 
                                                          
9 Due to the low efficiency in Chinese capital markets, using Tobin’s Q to measure investment opportunities may 
generate biased results (Erickson and Whited, 2000). Therefore, we follow Xiao and Li (2016) and use a corrected 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of investment opportunities for Chinese samples to generate unbiased estimates. We thank 
an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
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in China, where bank bad loans are significant and bank credit supplies are driven by 
government policies. Therefore, the degree of financial development could be potentially over-
valued. On the other hand, the strong relationship between government and banks could drive 
credit supply to deviate from market equilibrium and to be affected by government policy 
orientation. To minimize such a possible over-valuation problem, we expect to use bank loans 
issued to private sectors/GDP as an alternative measure for financial development. The 
information on the amount of bank loans issued to private sectors, however, is not publicly 
available from banks’ financial statements. As a result, we use an indirect measure for the bank 
loans issued to private and SOE sectors at province level and control for first degree of 
autocorrelation errors (AR1) with fixed effects on the following model: 
 
𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗,𝑡 and  𝜇𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜌𝜇𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑗,𝑡, |𝜌| < 1    (6) 
 
where 𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑗,𝑡is the amount of bank loans issued to SOEs/GDP in province j; 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑗,𝑡 is the 
proportion of GDP generated by SOEs in province j; 𝜂𝑗 , and 𝜇𝑗,𝑡 are province dummy and error 
term. In total, we have 341 province-year observations and Table 9 presents the estimates of 
bank loans issued to SOEs. The bank loans issued to private sector would be the residual of 
total loans minus loans to SOEs. Again, our empirical results are robust to an alternative 
measure of financial development (Table S7). Our robustness test results are available from 
supplementary materials and our key findings still hold. 
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Table 9: Robustness test on the effects of financial development 
 coefficient t 
GDP by SOEs/total GDP 0.873 2.74 
ρ(ar) 0.727  
R2 0.165  
Number of Obs 341  
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
China is experiencing a slowing down economic growth and reduced fixed asset 
investment in recent years and M2 growth has deviated from GDP growth to a greater extend 
over the last decade. It is, therefore, fundamentally important to examine how corporate 
investment decisions made to sustain corporate investment and their competitive advantages in 
both Chinese and globalized markets. Existing literature has provided ample evidence on the 
important roles played by cash reserves in attenuating external adverse market shocks on 
corporate investment. However, the mechanisms and how effectively monetary policies affect 
corporate investment in China is under studied by considering the unique characteristics of firm 
and market conditions in China, such as state ownership and regional financial development.  
This paper sheds new light on the effects of public policies on corporate investment. 
We use empirical data from China for two main reasons. First, the financial markets in China 
are less developed and corporate investment could be financially constrained especially when 
monetary policies are tightening. Secondly, the unique state ownership in Chinese businesses 
may mitigate the effects of public policies. Our key results show that tightening monetary 
policies indeed reduce corporate investment in China and cash holdings mitigate such adverse 
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effects, especially for those financially constrained firms, non-SOEs and those firms 
headquartering in less developed financial markets.  
Our results provide important implications. First, our results show clear evidence that 
cash holding helps Chinese businesses improve investment efficiencies by smoothing 
investment during the periods with tightening monetary policies. Such a favorable effect of 
cash holding on investment is especially prominent for non-SOEs and those firms located in 
regions with less developed financial markets. Therefore, such firms could hold more cash to 
sustain their corporate investment activities. Second, at a macroeconomic level, government 
and policy makers should tailor their monetary policies to better fit into the regional 
circumstances by considering the variation of the degree of regional financial development. A 
unified monetary policy may put certain businesses (e.g. non-SOEs) and regions (e.g. those 
with less developed financial markets) into a disadvantage position against their counterparts. 
For example, during the periods with tightening monetary policies, government and financial 
institutions could provide additional credit or subsidies to certain disadvantaged firms or 
regions so that they could sustain their investment activities. Finally, local government should 
provide well-functioning institutional infrastructure to protect local businesses from external 
shocks in order to maintain sustainable investment and competitive advantages. In addition, 
future research should attempt to investigate more specifically on the effects of public policies 
on particular types of investment activities, such as R&D.  
Due to the limitation of the data available, we are not able to quantify the real effects 
of monetary tightening by using data from local government and local financial institutions to 
match the financing between firms and credit suppliers, by employing a Bartik approach (Cong 
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and Ponticelli, 2017) for instance. Our measures of monetary policies are also more 
macroeconomic oriented. Therefore, we call for future research to use more microeconomic-
based and firm level financial information to further quantify the economic effects of monetary 
policies on corporate decision makings in China. 
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Supplementary materials: Robustness test results 
 
To test the robustness of our key results, we run a set of tests. In Table S1, we report 
the results by using different empirical models: pooled OLS clustered at firm level (Model 1), 
panel data analysis with fixed effects (Model 2) and random effects (Model 3). Our baseline 
findings hold where tightened monetary policy reduces corporate investment, cash holding 
increases investment and there is a mitigating effect from cash holding on the adverse impact 
of monetary policy tightening.  
 
Table S1: Robustness test 1 – model variation 
Invest 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Pooled OLS FE RE 
MP -0.069*** -0.060** -0.069*** 
 (-2.65) (-2.30) (-2.65) 
Cash 0.039** 0.089*** 0.039** 
 (2.53) (4.45) (2.53) 
Cash×MP 0.134* 0.388*** 0.134* 
 (1.65) (4.36) (1.65) 
Constant 0.022 0.784*** 0.022 
 (1.37) (15.63) (1.37) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 13,730 
R2 0.199 0.168 NA 
F 167.665 81.097 NA 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t. T values are reported in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of control variables are not reported but available on request 
from the authors.  
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To explicitly control for the effects of financial crisis and the stimulus plan 
implemented in China after financial crisis on corporate investment decisions, we define a 
dummy variable, Crisis, which takes value of 1 for the sample observations between 2008 and 
2010 and 0 otherwise (Table S2A). We also construct a dummy variable stimulus, where 
stimulus = 1 if a sample observation is after 2008 when Chinese government implemented the 
plan with a total of RMB¥4 trillion and 0 otherwise (Table S2B). Both tables show that our 
earlier results still hold and Chinese firms invested less during and after the financial crisis 
even with a stimulus plan implemented in China.  
 
Table S2A: Robustness test 2A – financial crisis 
Invest 
Model 1 Model 2 Mode3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
All 
sample 
Financial constraint 
(KZ) 
Financial constraint 
(size) 
Ownership Financial development 
Low High Low High SOE 
Non-
SOE 
High Low 
MP -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.104** -0.109*** -0.147*** -0.074* -0.139*** 
 (-4.17) (-2.99) (-2.86) (-3.30) (-2.43) (-2.98) (-3.77) (-1.72) (-4.33) 
Cash 0.043*** 0.022 0.054** 0.023 0.050** 0.029 0.063** 0.018 0.059*** 
 (2.76) (0.89) (2.53) (1.01) (2.36) (1.53) (2.45) (0.70) (3.01) 
Cash×MP 0.170** 0.065 0.235** 0.124 0.213* 0.118 0.304** 0.042 0.250** 
 (2.14) (0.47) (2.22) (1.06) (1.89) (1.23) (2.21) (0.32) (2.51) 
Crisis -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.007*** 
 (-4.78) (-3.56) (-3.34) (-3.62) (-3.21) (-5.11) (-1.99) (-3.49) (-3.80) 
Constant 0.137*** 0.189*** 0.305*** 0.203*** 0.345*** 0.203*** 0.644*** 0.121*** 0.152*** 
 (6.66) (5.98) (7.86) (5.95) (7.50) (6.19) (3.99) (3.73) (5.70) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 6,828 6,902 4,796 8,934 
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.711 0.651 0.513 0.337 0.766 0.108 0.110 0.927 0.436 
Hansen test 0.689 0.568 0.158 0.057 0.085 0.605 0.916 0.599 0.586 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are System GMM. T values are reported in 
parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of control 
variables are not reported but available on request from the authors.  
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Table S2B: Robustness test 2B – Stimulus Plan 
Investi,t 
Model 1 Model 2 Mode3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
All 
sample 
Financial constraint 
(KZ) 
Financial constraint 
(size) 
Ownership Financial development 
Low High Low High SOE 
Non-
SOE 
High Low 
MP -0.076*** -0.079** -0.071* -0.082** -0.068* -0.049 -0.130*** -0.027 -0.109*** 
 (-3.12) (-2.32) (-1.82) (-2.49) (-1.65) (-1.45) (-3.36) (-0.67) (-3.65)    
Cash 0.053*** 0.029 0.065*** 0.028 0.059*** 0.036* 0.070*** 0.027 0.069*** 
 (3.43) (1.15) (3.11) (1.26) (2.76) (1.89) (2.76) (1.04) (3.59)    
Cash×MP 0.194** 0.080 0.261** 0.125 0.234** 0.128 0.316** 0.062 0.276*** 
 (2.46) (0.58) (2.50) (1.08) (2.09) (1.34) (2.30) (0.47) (2.78)    
Stimulus -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (-7.89) (-4.22) (-4.44) (-3.81) (-2.67) (-3.77) (-6.91) (-4.64) (-6.02)    
Constant 0.086*** 0.140*** 0.239*** 0.141*** 0.282*** 0.164*** 0.520*** 0.075** 0.099*** 
 (4.11) (4.60) (6.31) (4.40) (5.78) (4.99) (2.83) (2.29) (3.73)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of Obs 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 6,828 6,902 4,796 8,934    
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.900 0.75 0.601 0.367 0.563 0.012 0.076 0.790 0.587 
Hansen test 0.851 0.611 0.156 0.143 0.063 0.723 0.920 0.601 0.689 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are System GMM. T values are reported in 
parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of control 
variables are not reported but available on request from the authors.  
 
             To test the robustness of our results to alternative measures of monetary policies, we 
use benchmark loan rate and reserve requirement ratio (RRR) to measure the nature of 
monetary policies in different ways. Table S3 shows that our results are still robust.  
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Table S3: Robustness test 3 – alternative measure of the nature of monetary policy 
Invest 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Benchmark loan rate RRR 
MP -0.0790*** -1.110*** -0.064** -0.125*** 
 (-5.86) (-4.91) (-2.27) (-2.62)    
Cash 0.013** -0.093* 0.015** -0.040    
 (2.09) (-1.72) (2.09) (-1.32)    
Cash×MP  1.781**  0.294*   
  (2.00)  (1.87)    
Constant 0.186*** 0.204*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 
 (8.75) (8.53) (4.76) (5.03)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 8,793 8,793 
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.694 0.685 0.784 0.789 
Hansen test 0.985 0.989 0.766 0.810 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are System GMM. T values are reported in 
parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of control 
variables are not reported but available on request from the authors.  
 
We also use cash expenditure on fixed assets, intangible assets and other long term assets, 
standardized by total assets, to measure corporate investment alternatively (Table S4) and our 
earlier findings hold. 
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Table S4: Robustness test 4 – alternative measure of corporate investment 
Invest 
Model 1 Model 2 Mode3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
All 
sample 
Financial constraint 
(KZ) 
Financial constraint 
(size) 
Ownership 
Financial 
development 
Low High Low High SOE 
Non-
SOE 
High Low 
MP -0.130*** -0.099*** -0.152*** -0.098*** -0.138*** -0.150*** -0.147*** -0.132*** -0.131*** 
 (-6.59) (-3.71) (-4.97) (-3.80) (-4.32) (-4.74) (-5.51) (-4.05) (-5.33)    
Cash 0.053*** 0.011 0.078*** 0.041** 0.065*** 0.051*** 0.101*** 0.045 0.058*** 
 (3.67) (0.56) (4.08) (2.10) (3.24) (2.73) (4.71) (1.58) (3.53)    
Cash×MP 0.210*** 0.017 0.311*** 0.149 0.249** 0.212** 0.436*** 0.214 0.203**  
 (2.78) (0.15) (3.23) (1.37) (2.41) (2.17) (4.06) (1.52) (2.31)    
Constant 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.234*** 0.108*** 0.293*** 0.183*** 0.209** 0.113*** 0.130*** 
 (7.05) (5.92) (6.52) (4.70) (7.42) (5.99) (2.19) (4.30) (6.21)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of Obs 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 6,828 6,902 4,796 8,934    
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.102 0.103 0.061 0.061 0.066 0.102 0.252 0.297 0.101 
Hansen test 0.270 0.391 0.075 0.062 0.110 0.855 0.692 0.566 0.165 
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are System GMM. T values are reported in 
parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of control 
variables are not reported but available on request from the authors.  
We use a corrected Tobin’s (Xiao and Li, 2016) to measure investment opportunities in 
order to remove the bias generated in the analysis caused by the low efficiency of Chinese 
capital markets (Erickson and Whited, 2000). Table S5 shows consistent results where cash 
holding plays a more important role in mitigating the adverse effects of monetary tightening 
for non-SOEs and those firms with financial constraints and located in regions with less 
developed financial markets. In addition, we exclude those observations with negative 
investment and consider those with positive investment only (Table S6). Finally, we measure 
regional financial development in an alternative way by the amount of private sector loan/GDP 
(Table S7). Both Tables S6 and S7 suggest that our earlier baseline results are still robust.
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Table S5: Robustness test 5–corrected Tobin's Q 
Investi,t 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
All sample 
Financial constraint (KZ) Financial constraint (size) Ownership Financial development 
Low High Low High SOE Non-SOE High Low 
Q 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.006*** -0.003** 0.006*** 0.001 0.004** 0.004*** 
 (3.84) (3.63) (3.39) (0.89) (3.49) (-1.98) (3.45) (0.65) (1.98) (2.76)    
Cash 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.131*** 0.077*** 0.025** 0.020** 0.139*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.097*** 
 (7.85) (7.62) (6.48) (4.97) (2.31) (2.08) (6.35) (5.89) (4.13) (6.60)    
Cash×Q 0.002** 0.009*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.000 0.011*** 0.004 0.013*** 0.007* 0.009*** 
 (2.44) (3.56) (0.23) (3.73) (0.06) (3.14) (1.00) (4.09) (1.84) (3.05)    
MP  -0.033 -0.028 -0.029 -0.068** -0.064* -0.013 -0.070* 0.006 -0.051*   
  (-1.41) (-0.86) (-0.75) (-2.25) (-1.70) (-0.42) (-1.89) (0.17) (-1.69)    
MP×Cash×Q  0.032*** 0.006 0.041** 0.015 0.036** 0.026 0.040*** 0.029* 0.035**  
  (2.81) (0.36) (2.51) (0.93) (2.07) (1.35) (2.73) (1.66) (2.25)    
Constant 0.393*** 0.386*** 0.505*** 0.527*** 0.012 0.089 0.486*** 0.338*** 0.387*** 0.396*** 
 (7.21) (7.05) (5.95) (5.91) (0.36) (1.64) (6.81) (3.94) (4.42) (5.52)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of Obs 13,730 13,730 6,789 6,941 7,004 6,726 6,828 6,902 4,796 8,934    
R2_adj 0.066 0.066 0.087 0.058 0.098 0.105 0.089 0.054 0.055 0.071    
F 47.379 40.030 22.513 18.874 18.010 21.926 23.363 21.544 11.381 27.281  
Note: The dependent variable is Investi,t and models applied are System GMM. T values are reported in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. The nature of monetary policy is defined as expansionary (tight) if its value is smaller (greater) than sample median. The results of control 
variables are not reported but available on request from the authors. 
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Table S6: Robustness test 6 – baseline results with positive investment only 
Investi,t 
Model 1 Model 2 Mode3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
All sample 
Financial constraint (KZ) Financial constraint (size) Ownership Financial development 
Low High Low High SOE Non-SOE High Low 
MP -0.124*** -0.073 -0.140*** -0.062 -0.132** -0.049 -0.198*** -0.073 -0.153*** 
 (-3.84) (-1.51) (-2.58) (-1.44) (-2.21) (-1.04) (-4.03) (-1.35) (-3.89)    
Cash 0.063*** 0.026 0.075*** 0.018 0.088*** 0.041 0.083*** 0.027 0.083*** 
 (3.33) (0.82) (3.01) (0.66) (3.20) (1.19) (3.45) (0.85) (3.59)    
Cash×MP 0.371*** 0.136 0.461*** 0.145 0.515*** 0.199 0.521*** 0.193 0.455*** 
 (3.89) (0.77) (3.61) (1.03) (3.61) (1.08) (4.32) (1.22) (3.90)    
Constant 0.271*** 0.291*** 0.447*** 0.296*** 0.578*** 0.200 0.325*** 0.269*** 0.270*** 
 (11.61) (7.91) (9.55) (7.76) (9.91) (1.04) (8.05) (7.18) (8.68)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of Obs 9,357 4,687 4,670 4,991 4,366 4,485 4,872 3,233 6,124    
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.176 0.284 0.686 0.420 0.201 0.120 0.619 0.361 0.173 
Hansen test 0.378 0.054 0.182 0.112 0.332 0.212 0.804 0.485 0.145 
Note: The dependent variable is Invest and models applied are System GMM. We include samples with positive investment only. T values are 
reported in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of control variables are not reported but 
available on request from the authors. 
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Table S7: Robustness test 7 – alternative measure of financial development 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Financial Development 
High Low 
MP -0.038 -0.089*** 
 (-0.90) (-2.90)    
Cash 0.012 0.062*** 
 (0.41) (3.36)    
Cash×MP 0.020 0.249*** 
 (0.13) (2.63)    
Constant  0.130*** 0.137*** 
  (3.82) (5.41)    
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 4,399 9,331    
AR1 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.786 0.458 
Hansen Test 0.338 0.515 
Note: The dependent variable is Invest and models applied are System GMM. We include samples with 
positive investment only. T values are reported in parentheses and *, ** and *** denote statistical levels 
of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The results of control variables are not reported but available on 
request from the authors. 
